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NOTES
A Prior Restraint by Any Other Name: The Judicial Response
to Media Challenges of Gag Orders Directed at Trial
Participants
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1 the Supreme Court identified
the primary purpose of the first amendment as the protection and encouragement of an "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes."2 By identifying public debate
as the focus of first amendment protections, 3 New York Times implied
a conception of the first amendment that protects all elements of public debate: the speaker, the channel for the speaker's message, and the
listener.4
The Supreme Court has consistently extended first amendment
coverage to speakers5 and channels for speech. 6 First amendment protection of receivers' rights, however, has been ambiguous. 7 First
amendment doctrines thus remain primarily communicator-oriented.
In particular, prior restraint doctrine assumes restriction of speakers
previous to the dissemination of their speech to be the primary evil at
which the first amendment is directed. 8 Thus, prior restraint doctrine
is concerned only with restrictions directed at communicators, and
only with those restrictions that are previous to the dissemination of
the speaker's message. The communicator orientation of this ap1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. 376 U.S. at 269 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
3. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the First Amendment, 19 HARV. L. REv. 1, 12 (1965); Kalven, The New York Times Case; A Note on "The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 SUP. Cr. REV. 191, 204-10.
4. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
5. The Court's protective stance toward speakers is most evident in its protection of unpopular or offensive speakers. See, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (jacket bearing message
"fuck the draft" was protected by the first amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (speech of Ku Klux Klan member could be restricted only when the danger of inciting a
crowd to violence was substantial and imminent); see also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (upheld right of Nazi group to march through the
village of Skokie, Illinois); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 69 Ill. 2d 605,
373 N.E.2d 21 (1978) (same).
6. See, e.g., Hague v. C.1.0., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.) (invalidated
ordinance forbidding public meetings in streets and public places without a permit) ("[S]treets
and parks ... have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and
discussing public questions.").
7. See infra notes 115-33 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
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preach becomes problematic when potential receivers of speech claim
a right to receive the speech of willing speakers.
This problem is illustrated by recent efforts of media organizations
to challenge judicial orders that restrict the speech of trial participants, including trial attorneys, witnesses, and the parties themselves. 9
In such cases, the media assert a right to receive the potential speech
of the trial participants, rather than a right to speak themselves. However, courts have responded to these challenges under traditional communicator- oriented prior restraint analysis. Several courts have
characterized these orders as prior restraints in order to examine them
under the prohibitive prior restraint analysis, 10 while others have
found that such orders do not constitute prior restraints upon the media, and thus need only be examined under a "reasonableness" test. 11
The result of this split among the courts is an "all-or-nothing" scenario, in which participant-directed gag orders are either struck down as
prior restraints or upheld under a deferential standard of review. 12
Restrictions directed at the media, on the other hand, such as restrictions prohibiting the media from publishing information it possesses, are virtually always found to be unconstitutional prior
restraints. 13 By directing orders at trial participants, rather than at
the media, courts have found a back door for restricting communication about trial activities without incurring the prohibitive scrutiny of
prior restraint doctrine. 14 For example, during a particularly controversial murder trial, one Arizona trial court forbade the media from
contacting any trial participants, including attorneys, jurors, or par9. A highly publicized example of such a restriction is the order forbidding Zsa Zsa Gabor
from speaking to members of the press about her trial for assault of a police officer. Zsa Zsa is
Warned by the Judge: Hold Your Tongue, L.A. Times, Sept. 16, 1989, § 2, at 1, col. 4.
A gag order restricting trial participant speech constitutes a governmental intrusion between
a willing speaker (the trial participant) and a willing listener (the media). Challenges to orders
are thus distinct from efforts by a willing listener to compel information from an unwilling
speaker. The Supreme Court has declined to interpret the first amendment as a right to force
speech from an unwilling speaker, particularly in the face of countervailing public policy con·
cems such as privacy and confidentiality guarantees. Cf. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1
(1978) (plurality holding that press had no right of access to government-controlled prison facili·
ties). For further discussfon, see infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986); Co·
lumbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 238-42 (6th Cir. 1975); Connecticut Magazine
v. Moraghan, 676 F. Supp. 38, 42-44 (D. Conn. 1987). For a discussion of these eases, see infra
notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603, 610 (2d Cir. 1988). For a discussion of
this line of cases, see infra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
· 12. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
13. See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
14. If the participants themselves challenge the orders, courts must examine the orders as
prior restraints. However, the courts' practice of imposing the orders on the participants may
imply that courts assume that participants are less likely to challenge restraints than are media
organizations, or perhaps that prior restraints on individuals are less disfavored than restraints
upon the press. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
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ties. 15 Upon reconsideration, however, the court rewrote the order to
prohibit those parties from "be[ing] in contact with the media." 16
When a radio station challenged the order as a restraint of its right to
receive the potential speech of the trial participants, the Arizona
Supreme Court upheld the order under a "reasonableness" test. 17 In
contrast, the same decision applied the far more exacting prior restraint analysis to an order that prohibited the media from televising
courtroom sketches without judicial approval. 18 Thus, a mere semantic distinction - between an order facially directed at the media and
an order facially directed at the participants - enabled the trial court
to restrict pretrial publicity without incurring the prohibitive degree of
scrutiny that would be warranted by a direct restriction of the media.
Gag orders directed at trial participants do not directly intrude into
the media's editorial process, but instead result in a reduction of the
total communication available regarding trial proceedings. In this
way, participant-directed gag orders are effective, albeit indirect, restraints upon the media. This Note examines the dynamics of these
participant-directed restrictions and their consequent effect upon the
media. Part I examines participant-directed gag orders in relation to
traditional prior restraint doctrine. After discussing the history of
prior restraint doctrine and the present standard of prior restraint
analysis, Part I relates efforts by courts to apply. prior restraint doctrine to media challenges of participant-directed gag orders. Part I
demonstrates that judicial application of prior restraint doctrine to
these challenges leads to arbitrary results: if the court characterizes
the gag order as a prior restraint, it almost always strikes the order
down; if the court holds that the gag order is not a prior restraint, it
need only examine the order under a "reasonableness" test, a deferential standard that most judicially imposed gag orders can pass. Finally, Part I explores the rationales for prior restraint doctrine and
examines their relevance to participant-directed gag orders. This Part
concludes that participant-directed gag orders are not prior restraints
of the media, but that such restraints pose many of the same first
amendment problems that prior restraint doctrine was intended to
alleviate.
15. KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 249, 678 P.2d 431, 434
(1984). The case involved one of a series of killings related to organized crime. 139 Ariz. at 249,
678 P.2d at 434.
16. 139 Ariz. at 249, 678 P.2d at 434 (emphasis omitted).
17. The court asked "whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable and whether the interests of the [state] override the very limited incidental effect of the [order] on First Amendment
rights." 139 Ariz. at 256, 678 P.2d at 441 (alterations in original) (quoting Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 616 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
18. The court held the order to the "heavy presumption" against prior restraints, and examined "(l) the gravity of harm posed by media coverage; (2) whether other measures short of a
prior restraint would have adequately protected the fair-trial right; and (3) how effectively the
sketch order avoided the threat to a fair trial." 139 Ariz. at 251, 678 P.2d at 436.
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Part II exainffies the rights on which media organizations base
their challenges to participant-directed gag orders: a public right to
receive information, the press' right to gather news, and a public right
of access to trial. This Part concludes that the public's right to receive
information may provide a basis for media challenges of participantdirected gag orders. Under a public debate conception of the first
amendment, this right must be protected in order to provide the public
with the information it needs to function as an institutional check
upon the judiciary's performance.
Part III suggests two alternative approaches courts might employ
to protect the public's right to receive information from trial participants. First, courts could continue to apply prior restraint analysis to
media challenges of participant-directed gag orders, but could create
an exception to traditional standing doctrine that would allow the media to assert the rights of the restrained speakers. Given the highly
restrictive nature of prior restraint analysis, however, such an approach would likely prove overinclusive, foreclosing even those participant-directed orders that are necessary to preserve the
administration of justice. Second, courts could recognize media
claims based on a public right to receive information, and could accord. standing to the media based on a financial injury caused by the
information restriction. The court should examine such claims under
a standard of "heightened" scrutiny, based on the functional utility of
the speech at issue. This Note advocates that this second approach be
applied regardless of whether the challenger is a speaker or a receiver.
A single, standardized test would enable courts to protect the "public
debate" envisioned in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 19
I.

PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED GAG ORDERS AND PRIOR
REsTRAINT DOCTRINE

The majority of the courts that have faced media challenges to participant-directed gag orders have examined those orders under traditional prior restraint analysis. This Part explores the relationship
between gag orders and prior restraint doctrine. Section A briefly relates the origin of prior restraint doctrine and the standard of review
applicable to prior restraints. Section B details the judiciary's current
application of prior restraint doctrine to media challenges of participant-directed gag orders. Section B concludes that prior restraint
doctrine is inapplicable to media claims grounded in receivers' rights.
The final section evaluates participant-directed gag orders in terms of
the foundational assumptions of prior restraint doctrine. This section
concludes that although participant-directed gag orders do not them19. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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selves fit within the framework of prior restraints, they do implicate
the foundational premises that underlie prior restraint doctrine.
A.

The Origin of Prior Restraint Analysis

Prior restraint doctrine traces its origins to Near v. Minnesota ex
rel. Olsen. 20 In Near, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that
allowed the state to enjoin publication of "malicious, scandalous, and
defamatory newspaper[s]." 21 The Court held that "it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the
[freedom of the press] guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon
publication." 22 After conducting a functional analysis of the statutory
injunction, the Court concluded that the statute's "operation and effect"23 was to suppress speech in the fashion of traditional prior licensing and injunction arrangements. 24 Accordingly, the Court struck
down the order as .an unconstitutional prior restraint. Although the
Court claimed that prior restraints were not the sole concern of the
first amendment, 25 it implied that characterizing the order as a prior
restraint was a prerequisite to finding the law unconstitutional.26
The Supreme Court set forth the current standard for review of
prior restraints in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart. 27 Nebraska
Press Association held that a court order prohibiting publication of a
criminal defendant's confession constituted an unconstitutional prior
restraint. According to the Court, a prior restraint on the press may
be employed to protect the integrity of criminal proceedings only if
"the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such
invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." 28 In applying this test, a trial court must consider: "(a) the nature and extent
of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would be likely
20. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
21. 283 U.S. at 701-02.
22. 283 U.S. at 713.
23. 283 U.S. at 713.
24. See 283 U.S. at 718-19. Critics argue that the statute at issue in Near, which enjoined
publishers only from printing future malicious and defamatory speech, rather than enjoining
publication altogether, was not particularly analogous to a historical licensing.system. Facially,
"it was a system for subsequent punishment by contempt procedure." Emerson, The Doctrine of
Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 654: (1955). See also Blasi, Toward a Theory
of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11, 16 (1981) (statute did not establish a licensing system because publishers were not required to seek approval prior to publication). Emerson argues that, in practice, publishers would clear doubtful material in advance,
causing the judge to function essentially as a censor. Emerson, supra, at 654.
25. 283 U.S. at 716.
26. See Jeffries, Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 416 (1983).
27. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Nebraska Press Assn. opinion is famous for its statement that
"[i]f it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech,
prior restraint 'freezes' it at least for a time." 427 U.S. at 559.
28. 427 U.S. at 562 (quoting United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), ajfd.,
341 U.S. 494 (1951)).
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to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity; and (c) how
effectively a restraining order would operate to prevent the threatened
danger." 29 The Nebraska Press Association Court noted that previous
restraints on publication come to the test bearing a heavy presumption
against validity. 30 In application, this presumption has caused the
prior restraint test to function as a virtual ban on prior restraint of the
press. 31
B. Judicial Treatment of Media Challenges to Participant-Directed

Gag Orders
The Supreme Court in Nebraska Press Association suggested that
means other than direct restraints of the press may be appropriate to
restrict communication regarding trial proceedings. Among these alternative methods, the Court suggested that judges might restrict the
communications of trial participants when necessary to avoid excessive or prejudicial pretrial publicity. 32 Such orders are becoming increasingly common in the courts, and are thus subject to challenge by
media organizations who assert that these orders restrict their ability
to report on trial proceedings. 33 Despite the implication of the Nebraska Press Association Court that such restrictions are preferable. to
media-directed orders precisely because they are not prior restraints,
courts have tended to examine media challenges of participant-directed restraints under traditional prior restraint doctrine. Because
media organizations are grounding their claims in a right to receive
information, rather than a right to speak, courts' attempts to deal with
these challenges under a communicator-oriented standard have proved
problematic.
One group of cases has recognized that the media's receiver-rights
29. 427 U.S. at 562. The Court modelled its standard on Learned Hand's version of the
"clear and present danger" test as applied in United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir.
1950), ajfd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 427 U.S. at 562.
30. 427 U.S. at 562.
31. See Nebraska Press Assn., 427 U.S. at 570-71 (White, J. concurring); see also L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 858-59 (2d ed. 1989); Goodale, The Press Ungagged; The
Practical Effect on Gag Order Litigation of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 497, 498 (1977); cf. Schmidt, Nebraska Press Association: An Expansion of Freedom and
Contraction of Theory, 29 STAN. L. REV. 431 (1977). Schmidt finds the fatality of the test inherent in the test itself. According to Schmidt, the degree of certainty required to meet the Nebraska Press Assn. test will never be met by the necessarily speculative determinations preceding
gag orders. Id. at 465.
32. 427 U.S. at 564. The Nebraska Press Assn. Court rested its support on "[p]rofessional
studies ... recommending that trial courts in appropriate cases limit what the contending lawyers, the police, and witnesses may say to anyone." 427 U.S. at 564 (citing American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Fair Trial and Free Press 2-15 (Approved Draft
1968)).
33. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1852 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1981); Ramsey
v. Georgia Gazette, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1658 (Ga. Super. Ct. 1981), revd., 248 Ga. 528, 284
S.E.2d 386 (1981); see also Sack, Principle and Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 411, 427-29 (1977).
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claims do not fit coherently within the communicator-oriented prior
restraint standard. These courts have held that participant-directed
gag orders do not constitute prior restraints of the media and therefore
need only meet a standard of reasonableness. 34 In these cases, the direction of the order is dispositive of the applicable level of review: if
the order is not directed at the press, it cannot constitute a prior restraint on the press. 35
The Second Circuit adopted this position in In re Dow Jones &
Co. 36 The trial at issue implicated public figures, including U.S. Representative Mario Biaggi, in a conspiracy with Wedtech Industries. In
an effort to minimize pretrial publicity, the district court prohibited
parties and attorneys from making extrajudicial statements to the media. 37 Media organizations challenged this order as a prior restraint
on their right to gather news. 38
The Second Circuit held that the characterization of a gag order
depends on the status of the challenging party: a gag order constitutes
a prior restraint when challenged by the silenced individual, but not
when challenged by a third party. 39 Although the court found that the
restraint at issue "limit[ed] the flow of information readily available to
the news agencies,"40 it held that the order was less intrusive upon the
media than an order threatening direct sanction of the news agencies.41 While an order directed at the media would be examined under
the prior restraint standard, an indirect restriction need only be examined under a test of whether there existed "a 'reasonable likelihood'
that pretrial publicity w[ould] prejudice a fair trial."42 The Second
Circuit found that the district court's order was supported by evidence
of a threat to the administration of justice, that the lower court had
34. See, e.g., In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussed infra at notes 3644 and accompanying text); Radio & Television News Assn. v. United States Dist. Court, 781
F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986); KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d
431 (1984).
35. If the orders were challenged by the participants themselves, they would generally be
considered prior restraints. See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
36. 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988).
37. 842 F.2d at 606. The district court order prohibited all parties from making "[any] extrajudicial statement concerning this case (1) to any person associated with a public communications media, or (2) that a reasonable person would expect to be communicated to a public
communications media." The court indicated that statements "without elaboration or characterization" of "(l) the general nature of an allegation or defense; (2) information contained in the
public record; (3) the scheduling or result of any step in the proceedings;" or statements
"[e]xplaining, without characterization, the contents or substance of any motion or step in the
proceedings, to the extent such motion or step is a matter of public record" would not be included within this prohibition. 842 F.2d at 606.
38. 842 F.2d at 608.
39. 842 F.2d at 608-09.
40. 842 F.2d at 608.
41. 842 F.2d at 608.
42. 842 F.2d at 610 (citing Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966)).
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adequately considered less restrictive alternatives, 43 and that a determination of the order's effectiveness was unnecessary, as "the restraining order being directed at trial participants is undisputably
effective. " 44
The Dow Jones opinion identifies a critical distinction between direct restriction of the press and similar restriction of trial participants.
As the court noted, the participant-directed gag order lacks the "most
offensive aspect of a prior restraint [-] the censorship involved by
forbidding the dissemination of information already known to the
press and therefore public."45 Rather than merely depriving the press
of information, direct restraints upon publication "are a direct interference with the constitutionally guaranteed structure of a free
press."46 A direct sanction of the media interferes with the editorial
process, doing "violence ... to the constitutional role of independent
publishers."47 In contrast, participant-directed orders restrict the total flow of communication, but do not carry the intrusive connotations
of media-directed orders. For this reason, the Second Circuit held
that media challenges to participant-directed gag orders need only be
examined under a standard of "reasonableness."48
A second line of cases, however, has held that participant-directed
orders constitute prior restraints of the press.49 Columbia Broadcasting System v. Young so involved a gag order imposed on all parties, as
well as their "relatives, close friends, and associates," to a civil suit
over police shootings of students at Kent State University. 51 In response to a challenge by CBS, the Sixth Circuit held that the gag order
constituted a prior restraint on CBS' right to gather news. Although
the order was not directed at media organizations, the court held that
43. 842-F.2d at 611. The court listed several less restrictive alternatives, including "change
of venue, trial postponement, a searching voir dire, emphatic jury instructions, and sequestration
of jurors." 842 F.2d at 611.
44. 842 F.2d at 612 n.l.
45. 842 F.2d at 608. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989) (striking down
statute prohibiting the press from publishing the names of victims of sexual assaults).
46. Sack, supra note 33, at 427.
47. Id. See BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search for a Constitutional
Principle, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 482, 499 (1980) ("Free political speech may well serve the value of
informed debate, but the only inevitable consequences of permitting punishment or censorship of
publication is loss of freedom. On the other hand, the only inevitable consequence of a denial of
access to governmental information is less information.") (footnote omitted).
48. 842 F.2d at 609-10.
49. See, e.g., Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986); Columbia
Broadcasting Sys. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975); Connecticut Magazine v. Moraghan,
676 F. Supp. 38 (D. Conn. 1987). The Second Circuit's opinion in In re Dow Jones explicitly
rejects this line of cases. 842 F.2d at 608-09; see supra note 40-41 and accompanying text.
50. 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975).
51. 522 F.2d at 236. The order specifically forbade "all counsel and Court personnel, all
parties concerned with this litigation, whether plaintiffs or defendants, their' relatives, close
friends, and associates" from discussing the case "in any manner whatsoever" with the news
media. 522 F.2d at 236.
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"significant and meaningful sources of information concerning the
case [were] effectively removed from them and their representatives."s2 The court found that this curtailment of the press' right to
gather news warranted application of strict scrutiny. s3 Although CBS
preceded Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, s4 it applied a standard
similar to the prior restraint test ultimately established by the Supreme
Court. First, the CBS court required that the speech must pose a
"clear and present danger, or a serious or imminent threat" to the
administration of justice, with due consideration for the "heavy presumption" against the constitutional validity of a prior restraint. ss In
addition, the restriction must be "narrowly drawn" and imposed only
in the absence of "reasonable alternatives ... having a lesser impact on
first amendment freedoms."S 6 The court found that the limited threat
pretrial press coverage posed to the administration of justice failed to
overcome the presumed invalidity of such an order. s7
Other courts have followed the Sixth Circuit in categorizing participant-directed gag orders as prior restraints upon media rights. For
example, the Tenth Circuit, in Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 58
sustained a publisher's challenge to an order prohibiting jurors from
post-trial press interviews, on the ground that the order was an unconstitutional prior restraint of the publisher's first amendment right to
gather news.s9 Similarly, in Connecticut Magazine v. Moraghan, 60 a
district court applied CBS' strict scrutiny standard when a publishing
company challenged a court order forbidding trial attorneys from discussing a controversial murder case with the media. The court con52. 522 F.2d at 239.
53. 522 F.2d at 240.
54. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
55. 522 F.2d at 238.
56. 522 F.2d at 238.
57. 522 F.2d at 240.
58. 801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986).
59. 801 F.2d at 1236-37. Journal Publishing Co. involved a controversial trial that ultimately
found the City of Albuquerque and its police force guilty of civil rights violations. Following the
trial, the judge admonished jurors: "You should not discuss your verdict after you leave here
with anyone. If anyone tries to talk to you about it, or wants to talk to you about it, let me know.
If they wish [to] take the matter up with me, why, they may do so, but otherwise, don't discuss it
with anyone." 801 F.2d at 1235. The judge rejected a request by Journal Publishing Company
to rescind or modify the order. 801 F.2d at 1235.
60. 676 F. Supp. 38 (D. Conn. 1987). The criminal defendant in Connecticut Magazine was
charged with dismembering his wife and putting her head and limbs through a wood chipping
machine. The court wryly noted, "Not surprisingly, the case has attracted some substantial
attention in the media." 676 F. Supp. at 39. To curb media involvement, the court ordered:
No attorney involved in the prosecution or the defense of this case, under order of this court
and under pain of the contempt powers the Court has, will be permitted to make any public
statements to any member of the media about this trial while it is in progress. That means
that from today on until such time as the case terminates and by that the Court means until
a verdict is returned.
676 F. Supp. at 39.
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eluded that the order· constituted a "prior restraint on the right to
gather news and derivatively on publication." 61 Although the order
was not a direct restraint on publication, the court held that its effect
upon the press' right to publish warranted application of the prior restraint test to find the order unconstitutional.
Although this second line of cases recognized that the media has
an interest in receiving the communications of trial participants, it did
so under the communicator-oriented prior restraint standard. By applying prior restraint doctrine to receiver-oriented claims, these courts
failed to recognize the distinction between restrictions that directly intrude into the editorial process and restrictions that limit the total
amount of available communication without intervening in editorial
decisions. Accordingly, the CBS line of cases is inherently inconsistent with prior restraint doctrine in its traditional form.
However, the first line of cases, which rejected prior restraint analysis of media challenges to participant-directed gag orders, made judicial review of gag orders dependent on the status of the challenging
party. Although a participant-directed restraint is not a prior restraint of the challenging media, it is a prior restraint of the participant toward whom the order is directed. 62 As a result, the same order
may be subject to prior restraint analysis if challenged by the participant toward whom it is directed, and subject only to a "reasonableness" test when challenged by media organizations. For example, in
Radio and Television News Association v. United States District
Court, 63 a district court had forbidden trial attorneys from making extrajudicial statements to the press during the trial of a former FBI
agent charged with passing classified documents to Soviet agents. 64
When the defendant's attorney challenged the order as a restraint of
his rights as a communicator, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals labelled the order a prior restraint and struck it down under the Ne61. 676 F. Supp. af42.
62. See Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 536 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976) (sustained trial
counsel's challenge to a gag order restricting counsel from disseminating information obtained
through a deposition as an unconstitutional prior restraint); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th
Cir. 1970) (sustained challenge by counsel and defendants to an order restricting them from
speaking to the press about the trial). In In re Russell, 726 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 837 (1984), the Fourth Circuit implied that prior restraints may be disfavored only when
directed against the media. However, such a position would be inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's edict that the media has no rights that are greater than those afforded the general public.
Cf Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. I, 10 (1978) (discussed infra at notes 156-58 and accompanying text). See Freedman & Starwood, Prior Restraints on Freedom of Expression by Defendants and Defense Attorneys, 29 STAN. L. REV. 607, 618-19 (1977) (Court's disfavor of prior
restraint of the press is inconsistent with its holding in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974),
that the press merits no special first amendment privileges).
63. 781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986).
64. 781 F.2d at 1444.
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braska Press Association . test. 65 When an organization of broadcast
journalists later challenged a modified version of the same order, the
court held the order was not a prior restraint, and upheld the order
under a "reasonableness" test. 66 As Radio and Television illustrates,
prior restraint doctrine does not accommodate receivers' rights, and is
accordingly insensitive to restriction of the communication process as
a whole.
The present circuit split thus produces an "all-or-nothing" scenario for media challenges to participant-directed gag orders. If a court
characterizes an order as a prior restraint, the order must survive a
virtually prohibitive presumption against prior restraints. If the court
does not characterize the order as a prior restraint, it need only examine the order under a "reasonableness" test, a standard that requires only a "reasonable likelihood" that pret_rial publicity ·will
endanger the administration of justice, and only that the order be
"reasonable," rather than "narrowly constructed." 67
Neither standard adequately protects the media's interest in receiving communication. Since participant-directed orders do not directly
intrude into the editorial process, they do not appear to warrant the
prohibitive degree of scrutiny of the prior restraint test. However, the
restriction on communication available to the media implicates first
amendment concerns to a greater extent than implied by the "reasonableness" standard. In order to accommodate the media's interest in
receiving information, courts must establish some nµddle ground.

C. Application of the Prior Restraint Doctrine to ParticipantDirected Gag Orders
Media challenges to participant-directed gag orders represent a
concern for the communication loss that results from such orders.
This concern is the link between media challenges and prior restraint
doctrine: both are concerned with a reduction of communication.
The heavy constitutional presumption against prior restraints assumes that prior restraints are inherently more speech-suppressive
65. Levine v. United States Dist. Court, 764 F.2d 590, 599 (9th Cir. ·1985), cert. denied, 476
U.S. 1158 (1986).
66. The court examined "whether the restrictions imposed [were] reasonable and whether
the interests [of the government] overr[o]de the very limited effects of the [order] on First
Amendment rights." Radio and Television News Assn. v. United States District Court, 781 F.2d
at 1447 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 616 (1982) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting)).
67. The "reasonableness" test, although deferential, does require a court to make the minimal findings that pretrial publicity is likely and poses a threat to the administration of justice.
See Jn re New York Times, 878 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1989) (gag order could not stand absent a
finding that parties were likely to make extrajudicial statements to the press, or that such statements could be prejudicial to the proceedings).
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than other forms of regulation. 68 Prior restraints allegedly endanger
protected speech by inducing self-censorship, 69 increasing the coverage
of regulation, 70 and delaying dissemination of speech. 71 Prior restraint
doctrine reflects the perception that these factors make prior restraints
inherently more speech suppressive than subsequent restraints, and
represents an attempt to limit their use for that reason. 72 This section
examines the three traditional prior restraint rationales and applies
them in the context of media challenges to participant-directed gag
orders. This section attempts to show that media challenges to participant-directed gag orders address the speech-suppressive concerns the
prior restraint doctrine was intended to correct.
1. Self Censorship
Traditional prior restraint doctrine proceeds from assumptions
about the behavior of the party toward whom the restraint is directed.
If a party is subject to a speech restriction, she may refrain from even
unrestricted speech in an effort to insure that she does not violate the
restriction. Thus, the restriction results not only in the loss of the
restricted speech, but also in the loss of unrestricted speech that the
speaker herself censors. This self-censorship phenomenon, referred to
as "chilling" speech, occurs "when individuals seeking to engage in
activity protected by the first amendment are deterred from so doing
by governmental regulation not specifically directed at that protected
activity."73 For example, trial participants are chilled from speaking if
they respond to an order forbidding discussion of a defendant's testimony by refraining from media contact altogether. The participants'
fear of sanction causes them to interpret the restraint broadly, and
thus to abstain from speech that was not prohibited by the order.
Any chilling effect of a prior restraint is increased by the collateral
bar rule. 74 Under the collateral bar rule, courts may initiate contempt
proceedings upon a determination that the participant violated a gag
order, without regard for the participant's good faith or the order's
constitutionality. 75 The participant may lose her opportunity to pro68. See Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory,
70 VA. L. REV. 53 (1984).
69. Blasi, supra note 24, at 24-49.
70. Id. at 49-63; Emerson, supra note 24, at 657.
71. Blasi, supra note 24, at 30-33; Emerson, supra note 24, at 657.
72. It is a subject of continual debate whether or not prior restraints are inherently more
speech-suppressive than subsequent restraints. See, e.g., Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint,
29 STAN. L. REV. 539 (1977); Redish, supra note 68; Sack, supra note 33; Schauer, Fear, Risk
and the First Amendment, Unravelling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978).
73. Schauer, supra note 72, at 693 (emphasis omitted).
74. Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding ofthe Prior Restraint Doctrine: A Reply to Professor Mayton. 67 CORNELL L. REV. 283, 286 (1982).
75. See In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 184 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Blasi, supra note 24, at 20.
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test the order's constitutionality if she chooses to violate the order
rather than to challenge it through judicial channels. 76 Although
some courts no longer adhere to the collateral bar rule, other jurisdictions continue to use it to deter participants from testing the boundaries of their orders. 77 Thus, the collateral bar rule discourages trial
participants from testing the limits of gag orders for fear they will face
contempt proceedings without an affirmative defense based on the order's unconstitutionality.
Respect or fear of judicial authority is likely to increase risk aversion among trial participants. First, a gag order is directed toward a
small group of individuals involved in a specific trial. The personalized nature of the order may "bring[] the existence of a legal prohibition and the possibility of sanctions directly to the attention" of the
participant. 7 8 Participants intimidated by the individualized nature of
the order may become overly conscious of the need to comply with the
order to avoid contempt proceedings. Second, participants may fail to
understand the boundaries of the judicial restrictions. Particularly
where orders lack specificity, participants may suppress unrestricted
speech in order to reduce the risk of violation. 79 For example, a gag
order might prohibit participants from discussing the contents of a
criminal defendant's testimony with the media. Overlap of the defendant's testimony with other evidence may leave the participant unclear
about the limitations of the restriction. Rather than risk contempt
proceedings, the participant may refuse to discuss any related evidence, or may avoid media contact altogether. Finally, because contempt proceedings are heard by the same judge who imposes the gag
order, participants may fear that the judge will be inclined harshly to
enforce her own order. 80 Although the judge's accountability to an
appeals court may temper this tendency, 81 it is the participant's perception that chills participant speech. Thus, even in the absence of
judicial bias, participants who perceive such bias may become excessively risk averse in complying with a gag order.
76. Court orders restricting trial participant speech thus shift the burden of action from the
court to the trial participants. Rather than allowing the participant to speak, which would place
the burden on the court to act consequent to that speech, the collateral bar rule requires a trial
participant to challenge a gag order through judicial procedures before speaking, in order to
preserve any constitutional challenges. Blasi, supra note 24, at 28-30.
77. See Blasi, supra note 24, at 20; Barnett, supra note 72, at 551-58.
78. Blasi, supra note 24, at 37; see also In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 184 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
("[A] judicial order singles out particular individuals, increasing both the likelihood of punishment if the order is violated, and the probability that protected speech will be chilled regardless
of the defenses which may ultimately be available in subsequent proceedings.").
79. Blasi, supra note 24, at 40.
80. Id. at 23.
81. Id. at 34. But cj Emerson, supra note 24, at 658 ("A system of prior restraint usually
operates behind a screen of informality and partial concealment that seriously curtails opportunity for public appraisal and increases the chances of discrimination and other abuse.").
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Trial participants' perceptions of gag orders may cause them to
suppress speech beyond the boundaries of an order. This risk of "chilling" trial participant speech inures regardless of whether the gag orders are challenged by the parties themselves or by media
organizations. The result of such chilling is a reduction of the total
communication on the part of trial participants.
2.

Risk of Over-Regulation

Because prior restraints are imposed before the dissemination of a
communication, they represent a speculative determination as to the
potential harm of that speech. Advocates of prior restraint doctrine
believe that the conjecture implicit in imposing prior restraints tends
to "bring[] within the complex of government machinery a far greater
amount of communication than a system of subsequent punishment. "82 Gag orders, which are imposed upon a judge's estimation
that pretrial publicity will endanger the administration of justice, incur
this risk of over-regulation. The judge has a duty to ensure a fair trial,
particularly where the sixth amendment rights of criminal defendants
are involved, 83 and a typically risk-averse judge may overestimate the
dangers of participant speech, causing her to err on the side of speech
exclusion. 84 A judge may thus impose gag orders more frequently
than necessary, or may impose overly inclusive orders. Although the
judge also has a duty to act constitutionally, which arguably might
provide a counterweight to a propensity to impose overzealous restrictions, 85 a judge is likely to perceive the harms risked by an unfair trial
as greater than thqse posed by an unconstitutional gag order. Judges
may justifiably believe that a criminal defendant is more likely to appeal an unfair conviction than most trial participants, particularly disinterested witnesses, are to challenge a gag order. Further, a
conviction resulting from an unfair trial is likely to be reversed, neces82. Emerson, supra note 24, at 656.
83. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (reversing a murder conviction on the
ground that the effects of excessive pretrial publicity violated the defendant's right to a fair trial).
Although a judge's duty to insure a fair trial is greatest in the context of a criminal trial, where
the defendant's sixth amendment rights are implicated, judges have a duty to insure the fair
administration of justice in civil proceedings as well. See, e.g., FED R. C1v. P. 1 (courts shall
construe the rules of civil procedure so as to "secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina·
tion of every action").
84. See Blasi, supra note 24, at 52-53 ("[J]udges tend to be unduly risk averse in ruling upon
the daims of speakers.••. The ideal of a 'balanced assessment of competing values' is unlikely to
be achieved in the sterile, caution-inducing environment of adjudication prior to initial
dissemination.").
85. See Mayton, Toward a Theory ofFirst Amendment Process: Injunctions ofSpeech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 250·
51 (1982) (asserting that the propensity for over-censorship among administrative censors is not
shared by courts, which are more likely to be sensitive to free speech values).
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sitating a retrial, 86 while an unconstitutional gag order will simply be
repealed. 87 Based on her perception of the risks, a judge may tend to
protect the integrity of her courtroom to the detriment of free speech
considerations.
A judge's propensity for overregulating participant speech may be
encouraged by the relative ease of imposing a gag order. As with
other injunctions, a judge can issue a gag order "by a simple stroke of
a pen." 88 The court may issue gag orders sua sponte, or upon a motion
by the parties after only a limited hearing. 89 Gag orders may thus be
imposed without the impedime.nt of a full judicial proceeding. A judge
has little to lose by imposing such orders; they require little judicial
time or deliberation and fulfill the judge's responsibility of providing
the criminal defendant with an unprejudiced trial. The comparable
ease and potential benefits of restricting participant speech thus create
a dynamic in favor of gag orders that may result in unwarranted restriction of participant speech.90
C. Delay
Prior restraint systems cause a delay in the dissemination of speech
that may result in the loss of the delayed speech. For example, under
a licensing system, speech must be delayed until the speaker obtains a
license. This delay may result in self-censorship: "[t]he speakers
might decide not to apply for a permit because they anticipate that by
the time the permit is issued the occasion for speaking will have
passed." 91 Alternatively, speakers may apply for the permit, "but lose
their enthusiasm for speaking as a result of the delay to which they
have been subjected."92
Thus, although gag orders may be imposed only for the duration of
a trial proceeding, they may delay trial participant speech until information about the trial is no longer valuable to either the speaker or the
media. A trial participant may have some reason to believe the timing
of her speech is particularly important. If she must refrain from such
speech until after the trial is over, she may miss her only opportunity
86. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (criminal conviction reversed based
on findings of excessive and prejudicial pretrial publicity).
87. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975) (Sixth
Circuit issued writ of mandamus requiring lower court to vacate participant-directed gag order.).
88. Emerson, supra note 24, at 657.
89. Hunter, supra note 74, at 289; see also Blasi, supra note 24, at 54-63.
90. Emerson asserts that "a system of prior restraint is so constructed as to make it easier,
and hence more likely, that in any particular case the government will rule adversely to free
expression." Emerson, supra note 24, at 657. Further, Emerson asserts that "personal and institutional forces inherent in the system nearly always end in a stupid, unnecessary, and extreme
suppression." Id. at 659.
·
91. Blasi, supra note 24, at 30.
92. Id.
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effectively to disseminate that speech, and perhaps lose her desire to
disseminate the speech at all.9 3 For example, in United States v. Tijerina, 94 the Tenth Circuit approved enforcement of contempt proceedings against a criminal defendant who violated a gag order by
describing the injustice of his ongoing trial to a convention crowd in
an attempt to incite a political uprising. The audience for his speech
was likely available only at the convention, and his speech would
doubtless have been less persuasive after the trial had already been
completed. A trial participant's compliance with a gag order may
thus cost her an opportunity for effective communication and may restrict her freedom to choose her preferred forum.
In addition, tlie public may no longer have an interest in the trial
after the trial has been completed. The media consists primarily of
profit-oriented institutions that have no use for "obsolete and unprofitable" speech. 95 If participant speech is delayed beyond the scope of
public attention, the media may have little interest in obtaining and
disseminating that information to an uninterested public. In other
words, the media, rather than the trial participant, may lose their enthusiasm for speaking about the trial. As a result, delaying trial participant speech may effectively prevent that information from reaching
the public.
Delaying participant speech until the trial's end may prevent the
public from providing any check upon the judiciary until after the trial
has become afait accompli. 96 One of the primary goals of the first
amendment has been to provide the public with the necessary information to act as an institutional check upon government activity, including activities of the judiciary.97 Although judicial errors might be
identified after the trial, they can then be corrected only on appeal.
Given the expense and delay of the appellate process, the public's inability to observe judicial misconduct during the course of the trial
may have tangible repercussions for parties involved in civil and criminal litigation. Thus, if information about a particular trial is not available while the trial is underway, the public loses the opportunity to
respond to perceived judicial misconduct when that misconduct can be
most easily remedied.
Whether through participant self-censorship, profit-motivated reporting, or judicial overuse of gag orders, participant-directed gag or93. See Blasi, supra note 24, at 33.
94. 412 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969).
95. Emerson, supra note 24, at 657. But see Blasi, supra note 24, at 65 ("important exposes
regarding past events usually create their own topicality").
96. Prior restraint doctrine expresses concern that "speech relating to the behavior of public
officials be disseminated soon enough to permit a checking process to operate." Blasi, supra note
24, at 65.
97. See Emerson, supra note 24, at 658. The public's review of the judiciary is discussed
more fully infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
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ders have the potential to suppress protected speech. As a result, such
gag orders bring about a reduction of the total amount of communication available about a particular trial. As the preceding discussion indicates, prior restraint doctrine proceeds from the assumption that
prior restraints are particularly speech-suppressive. Yet the amount of
total speech reduction is not dependent on the status of the challenging party. When read in conjunction with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 98 prior restraint doctrine appears to be concerned with the total
reduction of communication, a concern that is implicated by participant-directed gag orders whether challenged by the participants themselves or by third party media organizations.

II.

RIGHTS IMPLICATED BY PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED
GAG ORDERS

Although courts have recognized that media interests are affected
by participant-directed gag orders, they have not agreed on the bases
for those interests. This Part discusses the three different rights courts
have found at issue in media challenges to participant-directed gag
orders. Section ~ discusses the history and application of the public's
right to receive information. Although no court has struck down a
gag order as a prior restraint of the media's right to receive information, the Second Circuit in In re Dow Jones & Co. 99 found that the
media's interests as potential recipients of the trial participants' speech
were sufficient to support the media's standing to challenge participant-directed gag orders. 100 Section A asserts that the right to receive
information is the most logical basis on which to ground media challenges to participant-directed gag orders. Section B reviews the right
to gather news, on which both the Sixth Circuit, in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Young, 101 and the Tenth Circuit, in Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 102 relied to strike down gag orders as prior
restraints. Despite these courts' holdings, this section asserts that the
right to gather news provides only illusory grounds· for media challenges. Finally, section C discusses the right of access to trial. Two
courts, the Arizona Supreme Court in KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court 103 and the Ninth Circuit in Radio and Television News
Association v. United States District Court, 104 have held that the right
of access to trial is the appropriate framework through which to examine media claims of a "right of access" to trial participants. Both
98. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
99. 842 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 377 (1988).
100. 842 F.2d at 608.
101. 522 F.2d 234, 240 (6th Cir. 1975).
102. 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986).
103. 139 Ariz. 246, 252, 678 P.2d 431, 437 (1984).
104. 781 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1986).
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courts ultimately held that a right of access to trial does not contemplate a right of access to trial participants. While section C agrees
with the conclusions of these courts, it asserts that the public needs the
information trial participants can provide in order to serve as an institutional check upon the judiciary's activities. Thus, this Part concludes that the right to receive information is the most appropriate
basis for media challenges, and that this right is particularly compelling in the context of participant-directed gag orders, which restrict
information that the public needs to review judicial performance.
A.

The Public's Right To Receive Information

The right to receive information, the right to gather news, and the
right of access to trial share a common foundation in the Supreme
Court's decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 105 In identifying
the encouragement of public debate as the primary purpose of the first
amendment, New York Times is credited with adopting Alexander
Meiklejohn's "citizen as ruler" interpretation of the first amendment.106 According to Meiklejohn, "All constitutional authority to
govern the people of the United States belongs to the people themselves." 107 However, "[s]elf-government can exist only insofar as the
[people] acquire ... intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous
devotion to the general welfare." 108 Thus, the first amendment "protects the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by
which we 'govern.' " 109 Accordingly, institutions such as the legislature, executive, and judiciary, which constitute the tools for self-government, may not abridge the public debate necessary to the
maintenance of an informed citizenry.110
Both Meiklejohn and New York Times contemplate a model of
public debate that includes the entire communication process. 111 Protected public debate implies not only a right to speak, but a corollary
right to receive the speech of others; i.e., a right to communicate. 112 In
105. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court reversed an Alabama police official's libel award for an
advertisement placed in the New York Times by civil rights organizations.
106. Brennan, supra note 3; Kalven, supra note 3.
107. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. Cr. REV. 245, 253 (1961).
108. Id. at 255.
109. Id.

110. See id.
111. See A. TAN, MASS COMMUNICATION THEORIES AND RESEARCH 53.73 (1985). Consider, for example, the watershed model of communication created by engineers Claude Shannon
and Warren Weaver: "[A]n information source selects a message from a set of messages available to him or her. This message is changed by the transmitter into a signal, which is then sent
over the channel to the receiver, which changes the transmitted signal back into the message and
then sends it on to the destination." Id. at 55. Under this model, the communication process is
not complete until the message has been successfully transferred from the information source,
through the channel, to the destination.
112. See Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 ("[T]he
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this sense, the right to receive information not only is implied, but is
necessary, for the communication process is not complete until the
receiver has received the sender's message. Thus, under Meiklejohn's
theory, "the right of the citizen to receive and obtain information"
becomes the "exclusive justification for according all persons freedom
of speech and other First Amendment rights." 113
Following New York Times, 114 the Supreme Court tentatively embraced a right to receive information. 115 For example, in Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 116 the Court struck down a statute requiring an
addressee to submit a written request for postal delivery of Communist
propaganda materials. 117 Although the Court did not explicitly recognize a right to receive information, it found that the statute at issue
was inconsistent with the " 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate and discussion that are contemplated by the First Amendment." Us In Stanley v. Georgia, 11 9 the Court, in striking down a
statute that prohibited possession of obscene matter, noted that constitutional protection of a "right to receive information and ideas" was_,
''well-established." 120
The Court retreated in later cases, however, from full adoption of a
right to receive information. For example, in Kliendienst v.
right to know serves much the same function in our society as the right to communicate. It is
essential to personal self-fulfillment. It is a significant method for seeking a better answer. It is
necessary for collective decisionmaking in a democratic society. And it is vital as a mechanism
for effectuating social change without resort to violence or undue coercion."); see also Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) ("The primary
concern of the free speech guarantee is that there be full opportunity for expression in all its
varied forms to convey a desired message. Vital to this concern is the corollary that there be full
opportunity for everyone to receive the message.").
This theory is distinct from theories that identify communicators' self-realization as the primary purpose of the first amendment. See Scanlon, A Theory ofFreedom of Expression, 1 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 204 (1972). Iffirst amendment protection were premised on theories of self-expression, it would not include listeners' rights because such rights diffuse first amendment protection
among both speakers and listeners. Emerson, supra, at 4-5.
113. Emerson, supra note 112, at 4.
114. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
115. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), is credited with the first articulation of
a right to receive information. While Martin preceded New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the
Court based the right to receive information on a model of the first amendment in which public
debate was "essential if vigorous enlightenment was ever to triumph over slothful ignorance."
319 U.S. at 143. See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (upholding the fairness doctrine in broadcasting on the grounds that the public has a right to hear from
both sides of a political debate); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (right to
receive information about contraceptives).
116. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
117. 381 U.S. at 307 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)). Justice
Brennan's concurrence asserted that the Court was upholding a right to receive information as
established in Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
118. 381 U.S. at 306-07.
119. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
120. 394 U.S. at 564.

1190

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 88:1171

Mandel, 121 the Court upheld the Attorney General's power to deny a
lecturer's visa waiver without regard for other persons' interests in receiving the lecturer's speech. 122 In Procunier v. Martinez, 123 the Court
declined to deal with a "right to hear," even though it held that mail
censorship in federal prisons violated the rights of expression of both
prisoners and their addressees. 124 If a right to receive information
was, as the Stanley Court had said, "well established," it is somewhat
surprising that it was not applied to these cases where parties were
asserting a right to receive verbal and written communications.
The Court followed these cases, however, with its strongest pronouncement of a right to receive information, in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 125 In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court struck down a regulation prohibiting pharmacists from advertising prescription medications. 126 When the
statute was challenged by a consumers' group, 127 the Court extended
"[first amendment] protection ... to the communication, to its source
and to its recipients both." 128 Accordingly, the Court held that the
advertising prohibition violated consumers' first amendment right to
receive information.
The Court has applied the Virginia Pharmacy right to receive information in other contexts. In affirming the fairness doctrine, which
required broadcasters to provide equal air time to competing political
viewpoints, the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 129 held
that the "right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of broadcasters, ... is paramount." 130 In First National Bank v. Bellotti, 131 the
Court struck down a prohibition on corporate speech that "limit[ed]
the stock of information from which members of the public may
draw." 132 Although the corporation itself challenged the statute at
issue in Bellotti, the Court based its decision on the need to preserve
speech because of its value to the public. 133 Beyond these few cases,
121. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
122. 408 U.S. at 770.
123. 416 U.S. 396 (1974):
124. 416 U.S. at 409.
125. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
126. 425 U.S. at 770. The statute at issue provided that a pharmacist's advertising of prices,
rebates, or ·credit terms of prescription drugs constituted unprofessional conduct. A pharmacist
could be subject to a civil monetary penalty or revocation or suspension of her license for violat·
ing professional standards. 425 U.S. at 752.
127. The statute was challenged by a Virginia resident, the Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, and the Virginia State AFL-CIO. 425 U.S. at 753 & n.10.
128. 425 U.S. at 756.
129. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
130. 395 U.S. at 390.
131. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
132. 435 U.S. at 783.
133. See 435 U.S. at 777 ("The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for
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however, the Court has given little guidance as to the scope of a right
to receive information.
The Court's inconstant reliance on a right to receive information
may stem from a concern that "focus[ing] on the more indirect and
diffuse rights of the listener would ... tend to weaken the system [of
first amendment protections]." 134 In Zemel v. Rusk, 13s the Court rejected a plaintiff's claim that his right to receive information entitled
him to a passport for travel to Cuba, in order to gain information
about that country. The Court commented that the right to receive
information was not "unrestrained." 136 As the Court pointed out,
"[t]here are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by
ingenious argument in the garb of decreased data flow." 137 The Court
may thus be wary that a right to receive information would prove
unadministrably broad in most contexts.
Despite the Court's concerns, recogniiing a right to receive information need not lead to wholesale abandonment of traditional speech
definitions. Recipients' rights may require protection only when the
interests of the receiver do not coincide with the interests of the communicator, 138 or when the communicator is unable or unwilling to assert her rights. 139 In these situations, it may be desirable to allow the
recipient to assert her interests in order to subject a communication
restraint to judicial scrutiny. For example, in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. 140 the consumers' (recipients') economic interest in receiving prescription drug advertisements did not coincide with the interests of the pharmacists
(communicators) in preventing price competition. 141 Pharmacists, as
a political coalition, were unlikely to challenge a restriction they had
placed on their own communication. Consumers, however, were constrained in their ability to make intelligent decisions regarding prescription drugs because of the lack of available information about
quality· and price. The only effective means of challenging the restriction's constitutionality was to allow interested consumers to assert
their right to receive the prescription adve_rtising. This may also have
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.").
134. Emerson, supra note 112,_at 4-5.
135. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
136. 381 U.S. at 17.
137. 381 U.S. at 16-17.
138. See Emerson, supra note 112, at 2.
139. See id. at 7.
140. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
141. The Virginia State Board of Pharmacy argued, however, that in fact the interests of the
two coincided because the price competition that would result from advertising would ultimately
harm consumers by decreasing the quality of service and raising prices. 425 U.S. at 767-68. The
Court rejected this argument.
·
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been the case in Lamont v. Postmaster General, 142 where the speech at
issue was promulgated by foreign publishers, who lack full constitutional rights within U.S. courts, 143 and in Kliendienst v. Mandel, 144
where the speaker was an alien with limited constitutional rights. !45
These cases illustrate the necessity of allowing receivers to assert their
rights as potential recipients of communication where the speakers
cannot reasonably be expected to assert 'their right to speak.
Under this analysis, media challenges to restrictions on trial participants are necessary to prevent unwarranted restrictions on the participants' speech where the participants are unwilling or unable to
protect their own right to speak. Although the public may have an
interest in receiving information about the trial, the parties to a trial,
particularly a defendant in a criminal trial, may have an interest in
suppressing such speech. While some criminal defendants may have
an interest in making a public appeal, pretrial publicity is often detrimental to criminal cases. 146 In such cases, a criminal defendant may
be more likely to claim a right to suppress information than a right to
speak. Thus, media challenges to restrictions on participant speech
may be the only viable means of subjecting such restrictions to judicial
review.
Similarly, the media may wish to challenge gag orders where the
restrained trial participants lack the resources or the incentive to
launch a court challenge to a gag order. Witnesses, for example, may
have little at stake in the primary litigation at issue, and thus may have
little motivation to spend time and effort challenging a restraint on
their speech regarding that litigation. Likewise, litigants, who bear the
cost of the primary litigation, may be unable to spare the resources
necessary to challenge participant-directed gag orders. A media
agency, on the other hand, is likely to have greater resources and a
greater financial incentive to assert communication rights. Consider
the situation presented in Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc. 147 Residents of
Woburn, Massachusetts sued Cryovac, Inc., alleging that Cryovac had
released toxic chemicals into the ground, contaminating the town's
drinking water. 148 The court prohibited the parties, their counsel,
consultants, and experts from making public statements about the suit.
WGBH Education Fund and CBS· challenged this order, seeking access to information about the trial for episodes of the television shows
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
missibly
147.
148.

381 U.S. 301 (1965).
Emerson, supra note 112, at 7.
408 U.S. 753 (1972).
Emerson, supra 'note 112, at 7.
See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (excessive pretrial publicity imper·
biased jury that convicted defendant of his wife's murder).
805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986).
805 F.2d at 3.
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"NOVA" and "60 Minutes," respectively. 149 The First Circuit ultimately held that the order did not violate the first amendment and was
entered upon an appropriate showing of "good cause." Given the litigation expenses involved in toxic tort suits, 150 it is conceivable that a
local organization of community residents would lack the resources to
pursue challenges to gag orders in addition to the primary litigation
against the chemical company. 151 Both public and network television
producers, however, have a financial interest in obtaining information
about such controversial topics.
Action by media organizations, which are likely to have greater
assets as well as a greater financial incentive to challenge gag orders
than most tort plaintiffs, may serve to protect the constitutional interests of both the media and the participants by challenging the restraint. Thus, media challenges based on a right to receive
information may provide the most effective means of preventing undue
i;estriction of trial participant communication.
B.

The Press' Right To Gather News

When a media organization asserts a right to receive information,
the right is often labelled a "right to gather news." Although several
media challenges to participant-directed gag orders have rested on this
right, 152 the right to gather news has been interpreted to be only as
broad as the public's right to receive information.
Suggestions of a right to gather news first appeared in the Supreme
Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes. 153 Although the Branzburg
Court held that a reporter had no privilege that would justify refusing
to respond to a grand jury subpoena, it noted in dicta that "news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections." 154 After identifying this new right, the Court warned that such a right is not
absolute, and "does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of
special access to information not available to the public generally." 155
Since Branzburg, the Supreme Court has consistently declined to
extend any special privileges to the press. For example, in Houchins v.
149. 805 F.2d at 3-4.
150. See generally P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MAss TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS (1986).
151. This argument becomes even more forceful ifthe restrained individuals are witnesses,
rather than parties. In such a situation, the parties might have an incentive to challenge the
orders, but cannot do so since they are not subject to the order, while the witnesses themselves
may have little interest in fronting a challenge.
152. See Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986); Radio & Television News Assn. v. United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975).
153. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
154. 408 U.S. at 707.
155. 408 U.S. at 684-85.
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KQED, Inc., 156 the Court rejected the media's claim that the public's
right to receive information implies a special right of media access to
prison facilities and other government controlled sources of information. The Court stated that a special privilege of access, unlike the
public's right to receive information, is "not essential to guarantee the
freedom to communicate or publish." 157 The Court's holding implies
that the right to gather news is illusory, affording no privileges beyond
a general public right to receive information. 158 Thus, for purposes of
identifying a right on which to base the media's challenges to participant-directed gag orders, a public right to receive information appears
to have more explicit support in the case law than a right to gather
news.

C.

The Public's Right of Access to Trial

In the context of trial proceedings, a public right to information
about those proceedings is often discussed as a "right of access to
trial." Because gag orders are issued in the context of trial proceedings, they implicate many of the concerns at issue in a right of access
to trial. This section reviews the origin and scope of a right of access
to trial, including the Arizona Supreme Court's attempt in KPNX
Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court 159 to determine whether the public's right of access to trial includes a right to interview trial participants. Because gag orders restrict the communications of private
parties, rather than withholding government information, they do not
fit squarely within the right of access to trial. However, participant
speech may meet the same purposes as a right of access to trial, by
providing the public with information it needs to review administration of justice.
The Supreme Court established a right of access to criminal trial
proceedings in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. 160 According
to the Supreme Court, a right of access to a particular trial proceeding
dep~nds on an analysis of (1) the historical tradition of access to the
156. 438 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1978). _
_157. 438 U.S. at 12.
158. 438 U.S. at 12. See also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (no first amendment
immunity from civil discovery order in libel suit seeking information about reporters' thoughts
and impressions); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (first amendment did not provide newsroom with immunity from routine searches); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843 (1974) (reporters had no greater constitutional right of access to prison facilities than that
accorded the general public); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (same); see Comment, Newsgathering: Second-Class Right Among First Amendment Freedoms, 53 TEXAS L. REV. 1440,
1445-46 (1975) ("Branzburg. Saxbe, and Pell dimmed for the foreseeable future the press' hope of
convincing the Court that the first amendment grants to the press, as a representative of the
public, a special right of access to information of public concern.").
159. 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d 431 (1984).
160. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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particular judicial proceeding at issue 161 and (2) the functional utility
of the information that access will provide to the public in its review of
the administration of justice. 162 A later case, Press-Enterprise Co. v.
Superior Court, 163 interpreted the Richmond Newspapers test as creating a "qualified" first amendment right of public access that could
only be restricted where the restriction was "essential to preserve
higher values" and "narrowly tailored" to preserve those values. 164
While the test first appeared in the context of a criminal case, several
courts have extended this right of access to trial to the civil context. 165
Prior to Richmond Newspapers, the public's right of access to criminal trial proceedings derived only from the criminal defendant's sixth
amendment guarantee of a public trial. 166 The Richmond Newspapers
plurality opinion, however, relied on a right to receive information as a
corollary to the freedom to speak and publish. 167 Following the lead
of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 168 the Court derived that corollary
from a "common core purpose" of the first amendment to assure
"freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
govemment."169 Noting that such public debate is particularly desirable in the context of criminal trials, 170 the Court held that the first
amendment prohibited the government "from summarily closing
courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time
that [a]mendment was adopted." 171 The court held that criminal trial
proceedings must be open for public attendance, "[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in findings."172
Justice Brennan's concurrence, in which he formulated the twoprong right of access analysis the Court later adopted, similarly rested
161. 448 U.S. at 564-69.
162. 448 U.S. at 575-76; see Note, The First Amendment Right ofAccess to Civil Trials After
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 286, 290-98 (1984).
163. 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
164. 478 U.S. at 9, 13-14.
165. See Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 752 F.2d 16, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985); Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-71 (3d Cir.
1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177-79 (6th Cir. 1983); see
also Wilson v. American Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Continental Ill.
Sec. Litigation, 732 F.2d 1302, 1308-09 (7th Cir. 1984). See generally Note, supra note 162.
166. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (upholding closure of pretrial proceeding in the face of a media challenge. The Court found that the public had no constitutional
right of access to a pretrial judicial proceeding independent of the defendant's right to a public
trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments.).
167. 448 U.S. at 576.
168. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
169. 448 U.S. at 575.
170. 448 U.S. at 575 ("Plainly it would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of
higher concern and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are conducted •...").
171. 448 U.S. at 576.
172. 448 U.S. at 581.
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on a public debate model of the first amendment.173 Justice Brennan
argued that the right of access "has special force" (1) "when drawn
from an enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information"; and (2) if "access to a particular government process is important in terms of that very process." 174 Brennan
found the first prong of this test met by a history of public trials dating
back to English common law. 175 Under the second prong, Brennan
found that public access to court proceedings is part of the system of
"checks and balances" providing "an effective restraint on possible
abuse of judicial power." 176 Accordingly, Brennan found that the tradition and the importance of public access to the trial process "tip the
balance strongly toward the rule that trials must be open."177
Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of the Court, applied this
two-prong test in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court 178 to strike
down a statute summarily excluding the public from all trials involving sexual crimes inflicted upon juvenile victims. Brennan followed
Richmond Newspapers' reliance on the "common understanding that
'a major purpose of [the first amendment] was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.' " 179 Brennan recognized the historical tradition of public trial, 180 and emphasized its functional utility in
both judicial and governmental processes. "Public scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the
factfinding process, with benefits to both the defendant and to society
as a whole." 181 Accordingly, the Court found mandatory trial closure
insufficiently supported where the necessity of closing a trial to safeguard a minor could be determined on a case-by-case basis.182
Because the media is interested in interviewing trial participants in
order to receive mformation about the trial, it may be possible to characterize the media's claim against participant-directed gag orders as· a
173. 448 U.S. at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
174. 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
175. 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
176. 448 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270
(1948)).
177. 448 U.S. at 598 (Brennan, J., concurring).
178. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
179. 457 U.S. at 604 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). Brennan's opinion in Globe was the first majority expression of "first amendment political theory as the basis for
a right of access to government information." Note, What Ever Happened to "The Right To
Know"?: Access to Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA. L.
REV. 1111, 1118 (1987). ·
180. 457 U.S. at 605. Chief Justice Burger's dissent argued that the majority opinion "ignore[d] the weight of historical practice." 457 U.S. at 614 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger's
criticism may imply that Globe rested its finding of a right of access to trial primarily on the
functional prong. Note, supra note 162, at 294.
181. 457 U.S. at 606.
182. 457 U.S. at 607-08.
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right of access to trial. 183 The Arizona Supreme Court thus characterized a radio station's challenge to a participant-directed gag order in
KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court. 184 Applying Justice Brennan's two-pronged test, KPNX held that the press did not have a right
to interview trial participants. First, the court found that "[n]owhere
in the extensive history of the public nature of criminal trials related in
Richmond Newspapers can be found right of access protection for interviewing trial participants." 185 Next, applying the functional utility
prong, the court found that "the significant role played by the media's
exercise of its right of access does not depend on interviewing trial
participants before or during the trial." 186 Accordingly, KPNX held
that the media had no right of access to trial participants.
As the KPNX court found, the historical prong of the Richmond
Newspapers test is the most problematic for media organizations challenging participant-directed gag orders. Restrictions on trial participant speech did not come into common usage until after the Supreme
Court's decision in Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart 187 imposed a
virtual ban on restrictions directed at the press. 188 Prior to that time,
courts did not need to restrict participant speech because they could
level speech restrictions directly against the media. Historical analysis
may accordingly reveal little in the c<;mtext of such a recent
development.
The Court's application of the Richmond Newspapers test, however, indicates that the test's functional prong should receive greater
emphasis than the historical prong. In finding a right of access to trial
proceedings in both Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia 189 and
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 190 the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of public access to trial proceedings to the public's function of providing a check upon the judiciary. In Richmond
Newspapers, the Court found public access to trial proceedings was
necessary to allow the public to provide "an effective restraint on pas183. Hunter, supra note 74, at 288-89.
184. 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d 431 (1984).
185. 139 Ariz. at 256, 678 P.2d at 441. The court determined that a right of access to trial
was limited to a right to "sit, listen, watch, and report." 139 Ariz. at 256, 678 P.2d at 441; see
also Radio & Television News Assn. v. United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir.
1986). The KPNX court based its conclusion on dicta from Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) that stated: "It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend
criminal trials to hear, see, and communicate observations concerning them as a 'right of access,'
or a 'right to gather information ... .' " 448 U.S. at 576.
186. 139 Ariz. at 256, 678 P.2d at 441.
187. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
188. See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570-71 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
189. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
.
190. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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sible abuse of judicial power." 191 Again in Globe, the Court emphasized that "to the extent that the First Amendment embraces a right of
access to criminal trials, it is to ensure that this constitutionally protected 'discussion of governmental affairs' is an informed one." 192
Richmond Newspapers and Globe thus establish the importance of the
public's checking function upon the judiciary. 193
The Court's emphasis on the functional utility prong may indicate
that it favors this prong over the historical prong. In Waller v. Georgia 194 the Supreme Court held that closure of a pretrial suppression
hearing violated a defendant's sixth amendment right to a public trial.
Although the Court rested its decision on sixth amendment grounds, it
impliedly relied on a corollary first amendment right of public access
to trial proceedings. 195 The opinion made no mention of a traditional
right of access, but instead relied heavily on the functional utility of
opening pretrial hearings to the public. 196 Waller, in conjunction with
the emphasis on functional analysis in both Globe and Richmond
Newspapers, may indicate that the functional prong of the Richmond
Newspapers test is the more dispositive of the two. 197
If emphasis is placed on the functional prong of the test, participant-directed gag orders are appropriately challenged as infringements of the media's right of access to trial. The cases establishing a
right of access assume that the public can check adequately the functioning of the judiciary only if it receives the necessary information
about the trial. As the Supreme Court has noted, the press does not
merely report the official version of the trial, but "guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judi191. 448 U.S. at 592 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270
(1948)).
192. 457 U.S. at 604-05.
193. See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) ("With respect to
judicial proceedings ... the function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to
bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of justice."); cf.
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) ("The operations of the
courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern.").
194. 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
195. See 467 U.S. at 46 ("[T]here can be little doubt that the explicit Sixth Amendment right
of the accused is no less protective of a public trial than the implicit First Amendment right of
the press and public."); see also Note, supra note 179, at 1120.
196. See 467 U.S. at 45-47.
197. Critics of the historical prong argue that it is of less importance because there is no
logical link between a history of access and the rationale underlying the right of access. "There is
no reason to believe that traditional openness is a useful proxy for the information's capacity to
promote self-governance. Indeed, information related to many of the most important public
issues has historically been closed." Note, supra note 179, at 1132 (footnote omitted). The Note
cites to an example discussed in BeVier, Like Mackerel in the Moonlight: Some Reflections on
Richmond Newspapers, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311, 326 (1982) (quoting Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 n.11 (1980)): "Because prisons 'do not share the long tradition of openness' of trials, surely discussion of, and hence information about, prisons do not fall
outside the first amendment's core." Note, supra note 179, at 1132 n.182.
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cial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism." 198 The
press' ability to check the judiciary's performance is severely limited
by restriction of its independent factfinding ability, including its ability
to interview trial participants.
If the government can be permitted to erect a wall of secrecy by forbidding those with knowledge from talking to the press, then the right to
attend and report what transpires is illusory; it becomes a method by
which the government uses the press as a conduit to transmit the official
line.199

Trial participants can provide information to the media that has been
excluded from the courtroom setting, including information a judge
may find tangential but that the public still finds relevant. Further,
the participants can present their own opinions, as interested parties,
as to whether justice is being done. Restricting press coverage to the
courtroom version of information eliminates the press' ability to discover material that may contradict the courtroom version, or incriminate the judge who determines what information is relevant.
Restricting the press to a sanitized version of courtroom proceedings undermines the public's confidence in both the press and the judiciary. Traditionally, the public has relied on the press to provide an
independent version of judicial proceedings. The public may react less
spontaneously to information about a trial "when [it] know[s] that the
speech has already passed through a regulatory filter. " 200 Audiences
will wonder if the integrity of the speech has been compromised in
order to receive a judicial "seal of approval." 201 This can harm judicial efforts to maintain the appearance of integrity and justice.
This danger is increased in the context of the judiciary, where the
judge herself controls the release of the information that will be used
to evaluate her performance. 202 In Nebraska Press Association v.
Stuart, 203 Justice Brennan warned that
[r]ecognition of any judicial authority to impose prior restraints on the
basis of harm to the Sixth Amendment rights of particular defendants,
especially since that harm must remain speculative, will thus inevitably
interject judges at all levels into censorship roles that are simply inappropriate and impermissible under- the First Amendment. Indeed, the potential for arbitrary and excessive judicial utilization of any such power
would be exacerbated by the fact that judges and committing magistrates
might in some cases be determining the propriety of publishing informa198. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350 (1966).
199. KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 246, 259, 678 P.2d 431, 444
(1984) (Feldman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
200. Blasi, supra note 24, at 64.
201. Id. at 67.
202. Note, John Z DeLorean v. The Media, The Right to a Fair Trial Without a Prior Restraint Upon the Media, 15 GOLDEN GATE u. L. REV. 81, 96-97 (1985).
203. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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tion that reflects on their competence, integrity, or general performance
on the bench. 204

A judge's power to impose speech restrictions may thus enable her to
conceal judicial error or impropriety.
The court in KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court 205 recognized that the media needs guidance and analysis from variou:; parties
to present a coherent account of a trial proceeding, but stated that the
courts are "not constitutionally mandated to provide such guidance. "206 As the dissent noted, however, the court's assertion
"misse[d] the mark." 207 Participant-directed gag orders do not merely
constitute a judicial failure to "provide guidance"; rather, such orders
affirmatively "prohibit[] the press from gathering news."2os In the
context of participant-directed gag orders, the government is suppressing private, rather than governmental, sources. 209 Although trials, particularly criminal trials, involve governmental interests, the
information remains in the hands of private parties. The media is not
demanding access to governmental property to which it historically
has no claim. 210 Rather, the press is seeking to interview independent
204. 427 U.S. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring).
205. 139 Ariz. 246, 678 P.2d 431 (1984).
206. 139 Ariz. at 256, 678 P.2d at 441.
207. 139 Ariz. at 259, 687 P.2d at 444 (Feldman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
208. 139 Ariz. at 259, 678 P.2d at 444 (Feldman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Following the KPNX court, the Ninth Circuit, in Radio and Television News Association v.
United States Dist. Court, 781 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1986), similarly misconstrued the nature of
the order's intrusion. The court pointed out that "the media has no recourse to relief based upon
the first amendment" when an individual refuses to give an interview, and argued that therefore
no right should accrue when the government, rather than the individual, restricts such interviews. 781 F.2d at 1447. This argument fails to distinguish private action from state action.
Individual freedom to refuse to communicate is not analogous to a state-imposed prohibition of
communication. For example, individuals remain free to choose not to discuss politics while
state-imposed restrictions upon an individual's freedom to discuss politics run directly afoul of
the first amendment. See, L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at 790. The participant-directed gag order is
thus a bar to speech that is entirely private.
209. In Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376 (1990), the Supreme Court struck down the
section of a Florida statute that prohibited witnesses to a grand jury proceeding from disclosing
the contents of the witness' own testimony. The Court emphasized that the prohibition at issue
vks distinct from an order prohibiting a witness from disclosing information the witness learned
only through the course of the grand jury proceeding: "[W]e deal only with respondent's right to
divulge information of which he was in possession before he testified before the grand jury, and
not information which he may have obtained as a result of this participation in the proceedings of
the grand jury." 110 S. Ct. at 1381.
There is some overlap between government information and private information. For example, access to jurors has traditionally been denied during the course of trial proceedings in order
to ensure unbiased administration of justice. Likewise, restrictions on attorney access to jurors
following the trial have sometimes been found to further compelling governmental interests in
maintaining the integrity of the judgment. See Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d
1233, 1236 (10th Cir. 1986). However, the relevant information jurors can provide to the press is
limited to the information they received through the trial proceeding. Since jurors obtain this
information through government proceedings, it is more properly viewed as government
information.
210. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
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information sources. In essence, a media challenge to participant-directed gag orders is asserting the right of two private parties to communicate with each other.2 11
Because gag orders restrict only private information, the inclusion
of the media's right to interview trial participants within a broader
right of access to trial is inappropriate. A right of access to trial is
generally conceived of as access to the trial proceedings and to the
materials relied on by the courts and juries in making judicial decisions. 212 This conception implie8 a right to materials in the control of
the government, rather' than a right to the speech of willing speakers,
including the government. 21 3 Media challenges to participant-directed gag orders are not requesting the government to release information, but to discontinue intrusion into a private communication
relationship. Accordingly, they do not fit into the traditional conception of a right of access to government proceedings.
A review of the public's right to receive information, the media's
right to gather news, and a public right of access to trial thus indicates
that the public's right to receive information provides the most tenable
basis for media challenges to participant-directed gag orders.
Although some media organizations have rested their challenges on a
right to gather news, the Supreme Court's holdings indicate that the
media's right to gather news is only as broad as the public's right to
receive inforniation. Neither does a right of access to trial support the
media's challenges: participant-directed gag orders restrict private
speech rather than access to government proceedings. However, analyzing media challenges through the framework of a right of access to
trial shows the strong public need for trial participant information in
order to provide public review of the administration of justice. Thus,
211. The dissent in KPNX asserted that "[t]he reporter and his informant have First Amendment rights to communicate with each other." 139 Ariz. at 259, 678 P.2d at 444 (Feldman, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
212. For example, the common law presumption of access to trial proceedings stems from a
right of access to judicial records. This right has been limited to materials on which the court
relies in determining the litigants' substantive rights. See In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1340, 1342 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
213. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's response to media claims of access to discovery materials. In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984), the Supreme Court held
that the first amendment right of access to trial did not include a right to discovery materials.
The Court categorized discovery materials as the property of the government that the government is not willing to disclose:
As the rules authorizing discovery were adopted by the state legislature, the processes thereunder are a matter of legislative grace. A litigant has no first amendment right of access to
information made available only for purposes of trying his suit. Thus, continued court control over the discovered information does not raise the same specter of government censorship that such control might suggest in other situations.
467 U.S. at 32 (citations omitted). See also Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010,
1028 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (distinguishing restrictions on discovery materials from "infringements on
speech independently obtained from non-governmental sources"), affd. on rehearing, 737 F.2d
1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[T)he government is in a very real sense the direct source of discovered
materials since those materials are made available only through the processes of the court.").
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it is important that the media be able to exert its public right to receive
information from trial participants, in order to inform public debate
regarding judicial performance.

III. A

COMMUNICATION ORIENTED ANALYSIS OF PARTICIPANTDIRECTED GAG ORDERS

As this Note has shown, participant-directed gag orders reduce
the amount of communication and information available about trial
proceedings. Although this reduction occurs regardless of the status
of the challenging party, courts use status as the variable to determine
the applicable level of review. If the challenging party is the restricted
individual, the order is labelled a prior restraint and must survive the
heavy presumption against prior restraints established in Nebraska
Press Association v. Stuart. 214 If the challenging party is a media organization, the order is found not to be a prior restraint and is typically upheld under only a reasonableness standard. As a result,
communication may be unnecessarily restricted when the media,
rather than the restricted individual, is the only party to challenge a
participant-directed restraint.
The traditional prior restraint doctrine was intended to alleviate
this type of speech suppression by prohibiting restrictions directed at
the media. This Note asserts that participant-directed gag orders implicate the same speech-suppressive concerns prior restraint doctrine
was intended to alleviate. 215 By basing protection on the rights of the
restricted parties only, however, prior restraint doctrine fails to protect adequately against speech suppression. 21 1?
The result is a loss of the "public debate" that New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan 217 indicated was the primary concern of the first amendment. According to the Supreme Court, the first amendment expresses a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 2 1s If
the goal of the first amendment is the protection of public debate, first
amendment protection must extend to all elements of communication:
the sender, the message, and the receiver. 2 19
This Part discusses two alternatives to the judiciary's present responses to media challenges of participant-directed gag orders. Section A argues that courts could continue to apply prior restraint
standards to these orders, but could create an exception to traditional
standing doctrine that would allow the media to assert the first amend214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

427 U.S. 539 (1976).
See supra notes 68-98 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 32-67 and accompanying text.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).
376 U.S. at 270.
See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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ment nghts of the restrained speakers. As this section demonstrates,
however, this approach may prove over-inclusive given the present
constitutional presumption against prior restraints.
Section B asserts that a preferable alternative would be for courts
to recognize media claims based on a public right to receive information, and to examine those claims under a level of intermediate or
"heightened" scrutiny. Although the media may encounter some difficulties in establishing standing to assert a publip right, these may be
overcome by recognizing that the media suffers a financial injury from
such restrictions that is not common to the general public.
A. Prior Restraint Analysis Applied to Media Challenges to
Participant-Directed Gag Orders
In order to prevent unwarranted speech suppression, courts must
recognize that gag orders result in the same loss of commqnication
regardless of the status of the party challenging those orders. In its
traditional form, prior restraint analysis prohibits speech restrictions
only when they are challenged by the parties toward whom the restrictions are directed. As this Note has shown, this communicator-oriented standard is unable to protect adequately the .communication
process as a whole. Courts might, however, adapt the prior restraint
doctrine to accommodate the claims of both speakers and potential
receivers of speech. For example, courts might allow the media, as
potential receivers of trial participant speech, to assert the speech
rights of the restrained trial participants. In this way, the media could
act to protect its interest in receiving communications in situations
where the participants themselves are unwilling or unable to assert
their right to disseminate these communications. 220
Ordinarily, however, a party has no standing to assert the rights of
third parties. 221 This approach would require the courts to create an
exception to traditional standing doctrine in order to prevent unnecessary speech suppression. Such an exception would be analogous to the
overbreadth doctrine. For purposes of challenging the constitutionality of statutory restrictions on speech, an overbreadth challenge allows
"[a] litigant whose expression is admittedly within the constitutionally
valid applications of a statute . . . to assert the statute's potentially
invalid applications with respect to other persons not before the court
and with whom the litigant stands in no special relationship." 222
Overbreadth doctrine represents a "conscious departure from conventional standing concepts" in an effort to preserve free speech, even the
220. See supra notes 138-51 and accompanying text.
221. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
222. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. Cr. REv. 1-2 (footnote omitted).
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speech of nonparties, from unconstitutional restriction. 223 The overbreadth claimant bases her argument on the rights of third parties, but
is herself" 'asserting [her] own right not to be burdened by an unconstitutional rule oflaw.' " 224 In the context of participant-directed gag
orders, the media is asserting its right not to be burdened by the resulting restriction of communication. Such challenges may be necessary
to preserve the preference for freedom of speech expressed by both
overbreadth analysis and prim; restraint doctrine.
In extending standing to assert prior restraint claims, however,
courts must recognize that the prior restraint standard is presently applied as a virtual ban on prior restraints of speech. 225 Such broad application of this doctrine could result in the prohibition of all restraints
on both the media and trial participants. This prohibition would allow
the courts little flexibility in responding to pretrial publicity that
threatens to prevent the administration of a fair trial. 226 This result
indicates that the pre-publication nature of a restriction should not be
the sole determinant of constitutionality.

B. Recognition of the Media's Ability To Assert a Public Right To
Receive Information from Trial Participants .

A second alternative would be to apply a lesser degree of scrutiny
to participant-directed gag orders, in response to challenges by either
the restricted party or the media. This alternative abandons prior restraint analysis, not because it rejects the premise that prior restraints
are inherently speech-suppressive, but because the standard protects
only communicator interests. For example, a standard of heightened
scrutiny - a standard not prohibitive of prior restraints, but more
exacting than a "reasonableness" standard - would allow the imposition of some restraints, but would permit only those restrictions that
least threaten to reduce the total amount of information available
about the trial.
The standard of heightened scrutiny is a softer version of the prior
restraint test. Under the standard of heightened scrutiny, a court
must examine "the magnitude and imminence of the threatened harm,
the effectiveness of the protective order in preventing the harm, the
availability of less restrictive means of doing so, and the narrowness of
223. Id. at 1.
224. Id. at 4 (quoting Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV.
844, 848 (1970)).
225. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
226. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (murder conviction reversed on the
ground that excessive pretrial publicity had vitiated the possibility of a fair trial); see also Florida
Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2615 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the privacy interests of the victim of a crime may sometimes be more compelling than similar interests on the part
of the criminal defendant).

April 1990]

Note - A Prior Restraint by Any Other Name

1205

the order if it is deemed necessary." 227 This test is less restrictive than
the prior restraint test because it lacks the presumption against constitutionality presently associated with that test. However, it is more restrictive than the "reasonableness" test. 228 First, it requires the court
to evaluate the magnitude and imminence of the harm, rather than
simply its likelihood. Thus, trial participant speech must pose a significant harm to the trial process in order to warrant a measure that is as
speech-restrictive as a gag order. Second, unlike the reasonableness
test, the heightened scrutiny test requires an order to be narrowly tailored. This would eliminate broad gag orders, such as the one struck
down in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Young 229 which had restricted "all counsel and Court personnel, all parties concerned with
this litigation, whether plaintiffs or defendants, their relatives, close
friends, and associates" from discussing the case "in any manner
whatsoever" with the news media. 230 As a means of achieving some
degree of consistency in review of participant-directed gag orders, the
heightened scrutiny test approaches a middle ground between the
prior restraint test and the reasonableness test.
The test itself resembles the intermediate level of scrutiny applied
to statutes. that make distinctions .based on illegitimacy, gender, or
other quasi-suspect classifications.231 Like intermediate scrutiny, this
softer prior restraint test eliminates the "all-or-nothing choice between minimum rationality and strict scrutiny" that presently exists
under a communicator-oriented first amendment. 232 By striking this
middle ground, and by applying the test to claims of receivers, as well
as communicators, consistent application of a heightened scrutiny
standard would protect the communication process as a whole, thus
preserving public debate as it was conceived of in New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan. 233
However, media organizations may face standing difficulties in asserting a public right to receive information. In order to merit standing, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that the challenged action has caused
227. In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 1981). The First Circuit applied
this standard to restriction of access to discovery materials before the Supreme Court set forth
the "good cause" standard in Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34 (1984). See Anderson v. Cryovac, 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986) (upheld restriction of media access to discovery materials under heightened scrutiny standard).
228. See supra note 67.
·
229. 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975).
230. 522 F.2d at 236.
231. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (classifications based on illegitimacy must be
"substantially related to permissible state interests"); Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (gender classifications must be "substantially related to an important
objective").
232. See L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at 1609-10 (discussing the intermediate standard of scrutiny in the context of equal protection claims).
233. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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her to suffer injury in fact, and (2) that "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question." 234 As Part II discusses, the Supreme Court has recognized
first amendment protection of a public right to receive information. 235
However, courts may find that the media's claim to a public right to
receive information may be only a "generalized grievance" that does
not warrant standing. 236 One solution would be for media organizations to argue that loss of information, particularly information about
controversial current events, affects their ability to attract news consumers, and thus causes them to suffer a financial harm not shared by
the general public. 237 By basing their claims on a public right to receive information, but alleging financial injury peculiar to media organizations, the media may be able to show a sufficiently individualized
injury to warrant standing. 238 Such an injury would be caused by the
restriction of information, and redressed by the repeal of that
restriction. 239
Allowing standing to media organizations, but not to individuals,
would, however, appear inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decisions holding that the press has no privilege beyond that of the general
public.240 Yet media organizations would not be asserting special
privileges; rather, they wou1~ be representing the public in asserting a
234. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970).
235. See supra notes 113-33 and accompanying text. See also In re Dow Jones & Co., 854
F.2d 603, 607 (2d Cir. 1988).
236. Central S.C. Chapter v. Martin, 431 F. Supp. 1182, 1187-88 (D.S.C.), ajfd., 556 F.2d
706 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978) (media had no standing to assert a right to
receive information from trial participants where that right was "no greater nor lesser than the
public's at large").
237. See International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 218 (1918) ("(N]ews
matter, however little susceptible of ownership or dominion in the absolute sense, is stock in
trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise, organization, skill, labor, and money, and to be
distributed and sold to those who will pay money for it, as for any other merchandise."). One
might counter that a particular media organization does not suffer financial loss if no media
organizations have access to the information at issue. If profitability is determined relative to the
circulation or popularity of other media forms or organizations, then no one is gaining a competitive edge from such restriction. Media organizations could argue, however, that circulation and
sales for all media organizations increase in response to certain news items. Thus, a particular
organization is not disadvantaged relative to other media organizations, but the media industry
as a whole is disadvantaged.
238. In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669
(1973), the Supreme Court allowed a group of law students to assert standing to challenge an
increase in railroad freight rates that the students believed would result in a decrease in recycling.
412 U.S. at 685. The Court held that the students' injury, the loss of their personal enjoyment of
the natural environment that would result if unrecycled materials were allowed to pollute the
environment, was sufficient to warrant their standing to challenge the rate hike. Here, the media
is similarly alleging that its use of information is being restricted.
239. The Supreme Court has established that the injury suffered must be "fairly traceable to
the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief,"
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
240. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
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privilege they share with the public. Media organizations might be
considered representatives of the public for purposes of asserting the
public's right to receive information. 241
By recognizing the media's public right to receive information, as a
rigl;tt separate and distinct from the trial participants' right to disseminate information, courts extend first amendment protection to the
communication process as a whole. This interpretation of the first
amendment is consistent with the public debate model developed by
Alexander Meiklejohn and adopted by the Supreme Court in New
York Times. Application of this interpretation is particularly appropriate in the context of trial participant speech, given the Supreme
Court's efforts to inform public debate regarding the performance of
the judiciary. 242 Thus, recognizing the media's right to receive information from trial participants is the logical result· of the first amendment's protection of public debate and of an informed citizenry.
CONCLUSION

Despite the inherently reciprocal nature of communication, legal
analysis generally affords first amendment protection only to communicators. Because the communication process is inherently reciprocal,
a legal actor can currently achieve restriction of communication by
restraining the receiver, rather than the communicator, without 'incurring any heightened level of judicial scrutiny. Thus, following Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart's 243 virtual ban of prior restraints
directed at the media, courts began to achieve the same communication restriction by directing gag orders at the trial participants. When
the media has challenged these orders, many courts have responded by
applying a communicator-oriented prior restraint standard that is unable to accommodate claims based on receivers' rights. Although participant-directed gag orders do not intrude directly on .the media's
operation, they necessarily restrict the media's ability to gather information from independent sources. Unnecessary restriction of independent speech sources could undermine the public's ability to
provide a structural check upon the judiciary's integrity. Accordingly,
courts must apply a standard of review that can accommodate the
public's interest in receiving trial participants' speech.
This Note provides two alternatives.. First, the courts may continue to apply prior restraint analysis, but create an exception to traditional standing doctrine that allows the media to assert the free speech
rights of the restricted trial participant. Given the prohibitive scrutiny
of the prior restraint test, such an approach is likely to prove too rigid
241. See generally Note, Divided We Fall: Associational Standing and Collective Interest, 87
MICH. L. R.Ev. 733 (1988).
242. See supra notes 189-93 and accompanying text.
243. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
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to accommodate competing interests in protecting both the administration of justice and a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to
a fair trial.
The preferable approach is to abandon the prior restraint doctrine
for an intermediate level of scrutiny that applies to challenges by the
restricted party or by a member of the media asserting a right to receive the potential speech of that party. This approach reaches a middle ground between the prior restraint test and the "reasonableness"
test currently applied, resulting in a more predictable and equitable
standard for review.
A drastic departure from prior restraint doctrine in this context
poses serious questions to the doctrine in other contexts. For example,
courts must determine if prior restraints imposed directly on the media should be examined under this intermediate standard as well. If
the press' status is limited to that of the public's, a single standard
would appear mandatory. However, such a solution might not adequately account for intrusion into the editorial process. The Supreme
Court's adoption of a public debate model of the first amendment in
New York Times implies that the first amendment should focus on the
functional utility of the speech restricted, rather than on whether the
restraint is prior to publication or in the form of a subsequent punishment. The focus of first amendment debate must shift to the total
amount of speech that is restricted, rather than the direction of the
restriction. Courts, as well as first amendment commentators, need to
recognize that prior restraint doctrine is unable to protect speech adequately because it imposes a communicator- oriented standard on a
communication-oriented first amendment.

- Rene L. Todd

